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Abstract: It is argued that constructionist theory provides only a partial
account of how secure attachment leads to better social understanding. In
addition to cooperative parent-child relations, the more efficient arousal
and affect regulation system of secure infants, and developmental moder-
ators of the processes of imitation, may play a part in explaining the asso-
ciation and offer clues as to how effective social understanding is gener-
ally acquired.
Carpendale & Lewis (C&L) make a strong case that past attempts
at accounting for the influence of social interaction on the devel-
opment of children’s social understanding1 within the confines of
the three prominent models of theory of mind acquisition have
been at best partial. They reject both the enculturation and the ex-
tant developmental propositions (maturation, theory-theory, and
simulation) in favour of a model that assumes that social under-
standing is an emergent property of the child’s experience of cer-
tain regularities in interaction with others. The “epistemic trian-
gle” (i.e., referential interactions between infant and caregiver
about the object) is assumed inevitably to generate the discovery
that others sometimes have different beliefs about the world from
one’s own. If we, taking the point of view of the infant, assume the
existence of a stable external world, the actions of others in com-
municative interactions can only be understood given the suppo-
sition that they have different beliefs about aspects of the world.
Children achieve comparable levels of development at similar
ages simply because of the commonalities of their experience. The
corollary of this is that differences in the acquisition of social un-
derstanding are to be understood in terms of crucial differences
in their experience of triadic interactions. For example, our results
from the London Parent-Child Project (Fonagy et al. 1997) that
children securely attached at one year were significantly more
likely to pass the Belief-Desire reasoning test at five and a half
years (n 5 90, p , .005, OR 5 3.8, CI: 1.5–9.9) may be under-
stood in terms of attachment being a good marker for a coopera-
tive parent-child relationship, which, according to constructivist
theory, is the ideal context for the development of knowledge.
Although I do not fundamentally disagree with either the spirit
or the details of the case advanced in the target article, there are
important gaps in the model advanced by the authors. The target
article is helpful in drawing attention to the common ground be-
tween Bowlby’s (1980) and Piaget’s (1945/1962) thinking, partic-
ularly in relation to Piaget’s notion of schemes and Bowlby’s as-
sumptions concerning internal working models. However, how do
secure-autonomous internal working models in the parent lead to
the kinds of cooperative relationships “that might permit unre-
strained communication, that allows participants to understand
each other fully” (Habermas 1983/1990)? We have to assume a di-
alectic model of self-development (Hegel 1807) where the child’s
capacity to create a coherent image of mind is critically dependent
on an experience of being clearly perceived as a mind by the at-
tachment figure. The now overwhelming evidence for the trans-
generational transmission of attachment security is consistent with
this (van IJzendoorn 1995), and this may link to the emergence of
mentalisation in the child (for a review, see Fonagy et al. 2002).
Accumulating transgenerational evidence suggests that mothers
who conceive of their own childhoods largely in mental state terms
are more likely to go on to develop secure attachments with their
children (Fonagy et al. 1991; Target et al., in press) and to have a
more differentiated mentalised picture of their infant (Muzik &
Rosenblum 2003; Slade et al. 2001), which in turn is associated
with more mind-minded comments (Muzik & Rosenblum 2003)
and infant security (Slade et al. 2001). As the work of Elizabeth
Meins and colleagues (2001) suggests, mothers whose state of
mind with respect to attachment may be described as secure
(Main 2000) expose the infant to more mental state language,
which in turn advances the child’s social understanding.
Yet, more than mental state language, the coherence with which
the child’s mental state is perceived may be the critical variable.
In a study by David Oppenheim (Koren-Karie et al. 2002; Op-
penheim & Koren-Karie 2002), mothers were asked to narrate a
videotaped playful interaction that they had just had with their in-
fant. Mothers who were reflective in their narratives, able to see
various experiences through the child’s eyes and gain new insights
as they talked, were far more likely to have securely attached in-
fants than mothers who either had preset conceptions of the child
which they appeared to impose, or disengaged from trying to un-
derstand what was on the child’s mind. Most pertinent was the ob-
servation that disorganised attachment classification was associ-
ated with mothers who were incoherent, switching between the
above categories and not fitting well into any of them. Thus,
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“mind-mindedness” and security of attachment in the caregiver
appear to go together and are associated with a coherent working
model of the child that is richly imbued with representations of in-
ternal states. This is the substance of the collaboration and coop-
erativeness at the heart of constructionist theory.
Cooperative relationship rooted in the coherence of the per-
ception of the child’s mental state may not be the only factor. The
development of the key psychological capacities that underpin
theory of mind may be grounded in the attachment relationship
(Fonagy & Target 2002; Fonagy et al. 2002). It is quite probable
that an important mediator of the association of secure attachment
and theory-of-mind development lies in the regulation of physio-
logical arousal. Secure attachment may be conducive to mentalis-
ing because it facilitates an optimal level of arousal (Field 1985;
Kraemer 1999; Panksepp et al. 1999). Mentalising depends sub-
stantially on optimal prefrontal cortex functioning (Adolphs 2003;
Blair & Cipolotti 2000; Rowe et al. 2001; Siegal & Varley 2002;
Stuss et al. 2001). Medial and orbital prefrontal cortices have been
linked to the regulation of interpersonal relationships, social co-
operativity, moral behaviour, and social aggression (Damasio
2003; Davidson et al. 2000; Greene & Haidt 2002; Kelley et al.
2002; Schore 2003). The optimal functioning of the prefrontal cor-
tex in turn depends on optimal arousal. Neurochemical regulation
of the prefrontal cortex is complementary to that of posterior cor-
tex and subcortical structures2 (Arnsten 1998; Arnsten et al. 1999).
Arnsten and Mayes (Arnsten 1998; Arnsten et al. 1999; Mayes
2000) have argued that when arousal exceeds a certain threshold,
it is as if a neurochemical switch is thrown. This switch shifts us
out of the executive mode of flexible reflective responding into the
fight-or-flight mode of action-centred responding. Those with in-
secure or disorganised attachment relationships are sensitised to
intimate interpersonal encounters and experience higher arousal,
and the relative level of arousal in the frontal or posterior part of
the cortex readily shifts posteriorly.
Similar arguments could be mounted in relation to effortful
control. The capacity to inhibit a dominant response in place of a
subdominant one is a key achievement of early development
(Kochanska et al. 2000; Rothbart et al. 2000). It also appears to be
powerfully predicted by security of attachment at one year
(Kochanska 2001; Kochanska et al. 2000; Kreppner et al. 2001).
Mentalising involves setting aside immediate physical reality in
favour of a less compelling reality of the other’s internal state. Pre-
vious studies have linked the acquisition of effortful control to per-
formance on the false belief tasks as they follow a common devel-
opmental timetable and share a common brain region and yield
common types of pathology (Carlson & Moses 2001). Hence, we
would argue that children with a background of secure attachment
are more rapid in their acquisition of mentalisation in the context
of social relationships because secure attachment has equipped
them with the capacity appropriately to attend selectively to crit-
ical aspects of such interactions.
More recently one of the most creative writers in this field,
George Gergely (2003), has identified two strategies of imitation
in 14- to 18-month-old infants; 14-month-olds use an observa-
tional learning strategy based on an active process of evaluation of
situational constraints using the principle of rational action
(Gergely & Csibra 1997; 2003), imitating only when the other’s ac-
tion is not explained by situational constraints and therefore points
to the affordance property of the object (Gergely et al. 2002). (In
a modified replication of Meltzoff ’s famous study of the infant im-
itating the experimenter switching a light on in a box by touching
it with his head, Gergely et al. [2002] showed that imitation does
not occur when the hands of the actor are visibly constrained, and
when the infant interprets the use of the head as a rational action
justified by the actor’s immobilisation and not relevant to the in-
fant because the infant’s hands are free.) Four months later, the
physical constraints appear irrelevant (Gergely 2003), as the infant
imitates regardless of the observed physical constraints; it is as-
sumed that this is because the infant presumes a cooperative in-
tention to teach on the part of the actor. Thus, by 18 months the
infant presumes that the actor as a rational mental agent has al-
ready tested the rationality of the novel action him- or herself.
Gergely’s work has an important qualification for constructivist
theory insofar as that the gradual emergence of mentalisation ap-
pears to change the experience of the “epistemic triangle” for the
infant. The experience of interchange evolves from a teleological
experience at 14 months to the beginning of a mentalistic one by
18 months.3 Gergely (2003) argues that one of the central envi-
ronmental factors that contributes to the shift from teleological
emulation to the assumption of a cooperative intention to teach,
is previous experience of “benevolent teaching” interactions initi-
ated by the caregiver. It is likely that in dysfunctional attachment
contexts, the infant learns to interpret parental initiation of eye
contact and other communicative attention-directing behaviours
as cues signalling that potentially harmful interactions are likely to
follow. The infant may develop the defensive coping strategy of 
inhibiting the mentalistic interpretation of such communicative
behavioural cues. Hence, in severely dysfunctional attachment
contexts, infants are likely to fail to interpret mentalistically the
communicative referential cues of the demonstrator as indicating
a benevolent and cooperative intention to teach.
In brief, while broadly accepting the constructivist model, we
suggest (1) that specific capacities (arousal regulation, effortful
control) link the secure base that generates secure attachment
with evolving symbolic function; (2) that the link of the secure
base phenomenon to the development of mentalisation will be in-
creasingly understood to be causal rather than correlational, in
that the group of capacities that underpin adequate social under-
standing (what Bogdan [1997] called interpretation) are evolu-
tionarily tied to it; in other words, that the evolutionary function
of the attachment relationship in humans goes beyond the pro-
tection of the vulnerable infant to providing an environment
within which social understanding may be acquired; and there-
fore, finally (3) that deficits in attachment create a vulnerability in
the child to later environmental challenges.
NOTES
1. Our preferred term for social understanding has been “mentalisa-
tion” (see Morton 1989).
2. As the level of cortical activation increases through mutually inter-
active norepinephrine alpha 2 and dopamine D1 systems, prefrontal cor-
tical function improves on capacities such as anticipation (shifting of at-
tention), planning/organisation, and working memory. With excessive
stimulation, norepinephrine alpha 1 and dopamine D1 inhibitory activity
increases; the prefrontal cortex goes “off-line,” and posterior cortical and
subcortical functions (e.g., more automatic functions) take over. Increas-
ing levels of norepinephrine and dopamine interact such that above
threshold, the balance shifts from prefrontal executive functioning to
amygdala-mediated memory encoding and posterior-subcortical auto-
matic responding (fight-flight-freeze).
3. In this sense, of course, the constructivist account skirts circularity
but gets round it by the assumption of the gradual emergence of the men-
talising capacity.
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